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THE AUTOMATED ADMINSTRATIVE STATE:
A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY
Ryan Calo*
Danielle Keats Citron**
The legitimacy of the administrative state is premised on our faith in agency
expertise. Despite their extra-constitutional structure, administrative agencies
have been on firm footing for a long time in reverence to their critical role in
governing a complex, evolving society. They are delegated enormous power
because they respond expertly and nimbly to evolving conditions.
In recent decades, state and federal agencies have embraced a novel mode
of operation: automation. Agencies rely more and more on software and
algorithms in carrying out their delegated responsibilities. The automated
administrative state, however, is demonstrably riddled with concerns. Legal
challenges regarding the denial of benefits and rights—from travel to
disability—have revealed a pernicious pattern of bizarre and unintelligible
outcomes.
Scholarship to date has explored the pitfalls of automation with a particular
frame, asking how we might ensure that automation honors existing legal
commitments such as due process. Missing from the conversation are broader,
structural critiques of the legitimacy of agencies that automate. Automation
abdicates the expertise and nimbleness that justify the administrative state,
undermining the very case for the existence and authority of agencies.
Yet the answer is not to deny agencies access to technology that other
twenty-first century institutions rely upon. This Article points toward a positive
vision of the administrative state that adopts tools only when they enhance,
rather than undermine, the underpinnings of agency legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the Arkansas Department of Human Services decided to make a
change.1 Rather than having a nurse visit disabled residents at home to assess
their care needs, the agency hired a software company to build an algorithm that
would automate the determination.2 The agency hoped to save money.3 Instead,
administrators found themselves in federal court.4
Arkansas’ new system proved cruel and illogical. The Kafkaesque system
decreased the home care of an amputee because he had no “foot problems.”5 As
a result of the automated system’s dysfunction, severely disabled Medicaid
recipients were left alone without access to food, toilet, and medicine for hours
on end.6 Nearly half of Arkansas Medicaid recipients were negatively affected.7
Obtaining relief from the software-based outcome was all but impossible.8
A federal court enjoined the state agency from using the automated system
after a damning narrative emerged. Agency officials admitted they did not know
how the system worked.9 The authors of the algorithm and the software vendors
were similarly unable, or unwilling, to provide an explanation.10 On crossexamination in open court, the agency and its partners admitted not only that
they failed to detect the errors that the litigants uncovered, but also that in many
instances they lacked the expertise necessary to do so.11
Administrative agencies are a constitutional anomaly. They are permitted to
exist, we are told, because the world is complicated and requires expertise and
discretion beyond the capacity of legislatures.12 And yet more and more agency
officials are admitting—sometimes in open court—that they possess neither.
Agencies are invested with governing authority (over the objections of many)
1
Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00
AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336 (Ark. 2017).
5
Memorandum from Kevin De Liban, Attorney, Legal Aid of Ark., Legal Aid of Arkansas Algorithm
Absurdities—RUGs as Implemented in Arkansas 2 (n.d.) (on file with authors).
6
Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d at 343.
7
See id. at 340.
8
Lecher, supra note 1.
9
Telephone Interview with Kevin De Liban, Att’y, Legal Aid of Ark. (Apr. 26, 2019); see also Excerpted
Transcript of Trial (Court’s Rulings from the Bench) at 20, 31, Estate of Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-cv-00119
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016).
10
Excerpted Transcript of Trial (Testimony of Brant Fries) at 22, Estate of Jacobs, 2017 WL 2960793.
11
See id. at 49.
12
See infra Part II.A.
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due to their unique capabilities and knowledge, and now they are turning that
authority to machines.
Since the turn of the millennium, inadequately resourced federal and state
agencies have turned to automation for a variety of reasons but notably to
contain costs.13 A little over a decade ago, the problems associated with
automating public-benefits determinations came into view.14 In the public
benefits arena, programmers embedded erroneous rules into the systems, more
often by mistake or inattention than by malice or intent.15 Systems cut, denied,
or terminated individuals’ benefits without explanation in violation of due
process guarantees.16
Challenging automated decisions was difficult because systems lacked audit
trails that could help excavate the reason behind the decisions.17 Judicial review
had limited value in light of the strong psychological tendency to defer to a
computer’s findings.18 These problems affected hundreds of thousands of people
(often the most vulnerable), wasted hundreds of millions of dollars, and
produced expensive litigation.19 Agencies spent millions to purchase automated
systems.20 And they spent millions more to fix the problems those systems
created.21
Despite these concerns, agencies have continued to adopt—often via thirdparty vendors—automated systems that defy explanation even by their creators.
New York officials are still using the defective algorithm litigated in Arkansas

13
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1253, 1276–77 (2008).
As of 2004, 52 of 125 federal agencies surveyed by the Government Accountability Office reported the use of
data mining, defined “as the application of database technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and
modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the
prediction of future results.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL
EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 1 (2004). Data mining has its perils but differs from automation. We
further distinguish the use of modeling for planning versus the automation of agency tasks in Part IV.
14
See infra notes 30, 38.
15
See Citron, supra note 13, at 1256. For instance, the Colorado Benefits Management System (CBMS)
had been making decisions using over 900 rules that had never been subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Id. CMBS terminated the Medicaid benefits of breast cancer patients “based on income and asset limits”
unauthorized “by federal or state law,” required eligibility workers to ask applicants if they were “beggar[s]”
despite the absence of any legal mandate to do so, and denied food stamps to individuals with prior drug
convictions in violation of Colorado law. Id. at 1268, 1280.
16
Id. at 1279.
17
Id. at 1253, 1276–77.
18
Id. at 1271–72, 1298.
19
Id. at 1269 n.132.
20
See Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 381.
21
Citron, supra note 13, at 1269.
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despite its clear deficiencies.22 Idaho’s health and welfare agency commissioned
its own budget software tool to allocate the number of hours of home care for
disabled Medicaid recipients.23 That algorithmic tool also drastically cut
individuals’ home care hours without meaningful explanation and faced
challenge in court.24
The pattern is hardly limited to health administration. State agencies have
deployed algorithms and software to evaluate public school teachers in Texas,
to assess and terminate unemployment benefits in Michigan, and to evaluate the
risks posed by criminal defendants in D.C., Wisconsin, and elsewhere.25
Nor is the pattern limited to the states. The Department of Homeland
Security has long deployed an algorithmic system—the so-called No-Fly List—
to try to prevent terrorists from traveling.26 This data-matching program has
misidentified many individuals, in part because it uses crude algorithms that
could not distinguish between similar names.27 Thousands of people got caught
in the dragnet, including government officials, military veterans, and toddlers.28
The U.S. government would not say if one was on the list and provided no
explanation for no-fly decisions.29
An increasingly wide variety of federal agencies leverages algorithms and
automation in carrying out their statutorily committed duties. The IRS, SEC,
USPS, and myriad other federal agencies are using machines in one manner or
another.30 A recent report shows that nearly half of all agencies use, or are
investigating the use of, artificial intelligence.31 Just last year an Executive Order
22

Lecher, supra note 1.
K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 708 (D. Idaho 2016).
24
Id. at 706.
25
Lecher, supra note 1; see Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy:
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 776, 783–85, 792 (2019); RASHIDA
RICHARDSON, JASON M. SHULTZ & VINCENT M. SOUTHERLAND, LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT:
NEW CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 11, 19 (2019),
ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf.
26
See BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 261–62 (2017).
27
Citron, supra note 13, at 1274.
28
FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 261–62; Citron, supra note 13, at 1274.
29
Citron, supra note 13, at 1275.
30
Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the MachineLearning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1162–65 (2017). See generally DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANIEL E. HO,
CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf (recent and thorough review of federal use of algorithms).
31
ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 16 (“[C]ontrary to popular perceptions presuming government
agencies uniformly rely on antiquated systems and procedures, many agencies have in fact experimented with
[artificial intelligence or machine learning]. Nearly half (64 agencies, or 45%) of canvassed agencies have
23
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directed all federal agencies to explore the potential efficiencies of artificial
intelligence.32
Agencies are listening. A January 2019 request for proposals from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services sought a contract to coordinate
artificial intelligence procurement, describing the contract as “the next logical
step to integrating [intelligence automation and artificial intelligence] into all
phases of government operations.”33
The turn toward automation in recent decades has not gone unchallenged.
Scholars have repeatedly pushed back against governmental use of software and
algorithms to arrive at decisions and goals previously carried out by people.
“The human race’s rapid development of computer technology,” observed Paul
Schwartz thirty years ago in a related context, “has not been matched by a
requisite growth in the ability to control these new machines.”34 In 2008, one of
us (Citron) offered an extensive framework for evaluating and responding to
agency reliance on technology.35 In recent years this discourse has burgeoned
into a full-blown literature spanning multiple disciplines.36
Yet the challenges posed to the automated administrative state to date tend
to proceed from a very specific frame: the problem of automation arises when a
machine has taken over a task previously committed to a human such that
guarantees of transparency, accountability, and due process fall away.37 This
frame follows a tendency in law and technology generally to focus on how
machines that substitute for humans undermine certain legally protected values
or rights. The discussion of how best to restore due process in light of computer-

expressly manifested interest in [artificial intelligence or machine learning] by planning, piloting, or
implementing such techniques.”).
32
Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, Exec. Order No. 13,859, 3 C.F.R. § 3967
(2019).
33
Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 25, at 779 (quoting U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
SOLICITATION/CONTRACT/ORDER FOR COMMERCIAL ITEMS: SOLICITATION NUMBER 19-233-SOL-00098, at 9
(Jan. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/6DEC-L5WQ).
34
Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal
Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1322 (1992).
35
See Citron, supra note 13, at 1301–13; Citron, supra note 20, at 371–81.
36
See infra Part I.
37
An important, related literature examines the ways automation exacerbates inequality or entrenches
bias. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING EQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND
PUNISH THE POOR 180–88 (2018); Deborah Hellman, Sex, Causation, and Algorithms: Equal Protection in the
Age of Machine Learning, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev. (2020); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s
Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (2016).
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driven decision-making is an example.38 The debate around liability for
driverless cars is another.39
The 2017 article Accountable Algorithms is illustrative of the literature.40
“Important decisions that were historically made by people are now made by
computer systems,” the authors write, and “accountability mechanisms and legal
standards that govern decision processes have not kept pace with technology.”41
In other words, many consequential government decisions were once made by
people, attended by accountability mechanisms suited to people. Now that
machines make these decisions, law or technology must change to restore the
rights and values afforded individuals under the previous arrangement. The
authors suggest legal and technical mechanisms to restore the status quo ex
ante.42 Recently, some scholars and activists have called for a ban or moratorium
on the use of automation unless or until such issues can be addressed.43
We have participated in the project of restoring rights and values displaced
by technology for some time. The aim of this Article is to foreground a distinct
question: whether automation by agencies threatens to erode long-standing
justifications for having agencies at all.
On the standard account, legislatures delegate authority to agencies because
they must. The Constitution commits to Congress the authority to make laws;44
the world has become so complex and dynamic, however, that Congress must
delegate its authority to administrative agencies.45 The famously “functionalist”
rationale for delegation rests on the affordances of bureaucracies, particularly
38

See generally Citron, supra note 13.
See Ryan Calo, Commuting to Mars: A Response to Professors Abraham and Rabin, 105 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 84, 84, 87 (2019).
40
Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felton, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G.
Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017).
41
Id. at 636.
42
Id. at 682–92.
43
See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 6, 44–54 (2019) (suggesting that automation in the legal field should be limited to technology
that complements, rather than replaces, an attorney’s skills); Nathan Sheard, The Fight Against Government
Face Surveillance: 2019 Year in Review, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2019/12/year-fight-against-government-face-surveillance (discussing local and state bans on the use
of facial recognition technology and current concerns related to ongoing use by the FBI); Jane Wester, NY State
Senate Bill Would Ban Police Use of Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 27, 2020, 2:36 PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/01/27/ny-state-senate-bill-would-ban-police-use-of-facialrecognition-technology/ (describing a proposed New York State Senate bill that would prohibit law enforcement
“from using facial recognition technology and some other kinds of biometric surveillance” and “create a task
force to examine how to regulate biometric technology in the future”).
44
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
45
See infra Part II.A.
39
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their ability to accrue expertise and the prospect of flexible and nimble responses
to complex problems.46 Courts bless this extra-Constitutional arrangement and
defer to agency decision-making for very similar reasons.47
Mounting evidence suggests that agencies are turning to systems in which
they hold no expertise, and that foreclose discretion, individuation, and reasongiving almost entirely.48 The automated administrative state is less and less the
imperfect compromise between the text of the Constitution and the realities of
contemporary governance. At some point, the trend toward throwing away
expertise, discretion, and flexibility with both hands strains the very rationale
for creating and maintaining an administrative state.49 This is especially true
where, as often, the very same processes of automation also frustrate the
guardrails put in place by Congress and the courts to ensure agency
accountability.
The question we ask in this Article is not how to restore the status quo ex
ante given that machines have supplanted people. We ask instead whether
technology obligates a fundamental reexamination of why Congress is permitted
to hand off power to agencies in the first place.
The new direction we advocate is critical but ultimately constructive. We do
not recommend the dissolution of the administrative state, which has turned to
automation largely in response to a hostile political economy. Nor do we hope
to foreclose the use of technology by state or federal agencies. Our ultimate
recommendation is that agencies should consciously select technology to the
extent its new affordances enhance, rather than undermine, the rationale that
underpins the administrative state. This would be so even absent a looming
legitimacy crisis. We observe that, far from demand a return to the status quo,
new technology invites us to heighten and extend our expectations of what
government can offer its citizens. Such examples exist in the literature and
media; we believe they deserve greater attention and collect them here.
Our argument proceeds as follows: Part I traces the legal literature around
agency automation to date, indicating certain limitations in the approach
scholars (including us) have taken in framing the issues. Parts II and III advance
46
See Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 166 PA. L. REV. 633, 635 (2018) (“Looking to judicial
opinions or academic writing, the dominant explanation of and justification for the administrative state is based
on agencies’ expertise and expansive rulemaking and adjudicatory capacities.”); infra Part II.A.
47
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986); infra Part II.A.
48
See Citron, supra note 13, at 1261–62, 1277, 1282.
49
Said another way, why wouldn’t a Congress favorable to automation simply contract directly with
software providers to carry out its legislative will?
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the novel critique that, taken to its logical conclusion, agency automation
undermines not only constitutional and administrative procedural guarantees,
but also the very justification for having an administrative state in the first
place.50 This argument relies on recent litigation that has surfaced the dearth of
expertise and the lack of responsiveness and flexibility around automation in
open court, at least at the state level.
Part IV begins the complex project of resuscitating the justification for
technology-enabled agencies. In particular, we call attention to the prospect that
advances in artificial intelligence—thoughtfully deployed—have the potential
to improve agency decision-making and planning. Agencies are increasingly
able to “model” instead of “muddle” through and could use technology to help
meet societies’ rising expectations for impartiality and responsiveness.51
I.

REPLACING VALUES COMPROMISED

There is a growing sense of unease as machines intrude upon humankind’s
most important institutions. Scholarship over the past decade has explored the
impacts of automating various facets of criminal, civil, and administrative
justice.52 The consequences include the erosion of due process guarantees; the
entrenchment of race, class, and gender bias; and the denial of structural
safeguards. On the standard account, the “black box” of algorithmic justice
simultaneously propagates error and bias while providing the veneer of
objectivity.53 Tasks once performed by officials and juries are now undertaken
by machines.54 And procedural mechanisms of transparency and accountability
have not kept pace.55

50
Such an argument has been mentioned in passing, first by the authors and later by others, but has yet
to be developed into a full-throated account. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 13.
51
See infra Part IV (referring to Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of ‘Muddling Through’, 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959)).
52
See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 37; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 37; Robert Brauneis & Ellen P.
Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 115–18 (2018); Citron,
supra note 13; Citron, supra note 20, at 357–58; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society:
Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014); Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in
the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 56 (2019); Kroll et al., supra note 40, at 637–38; Andrea
Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1977–78 (2017); Schwartz, supra note 34, at 1322; Sonja B.
Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803,
804–05 (2014).
53
E.g., FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND
INFORMATION 107 (2015).
54
See Kroll et al., supra note 40, at 636, 703.
55
Id. at 636–38.
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This inquiry has a cyclical quality. Writing in 1991, Paul Schwartz
chronicled the growing dependence of the administrative state on the collection,
storage, and processing of data using computers.56 Organizing his critique
around two case studies, Schwartz argued that a newfound reliance on computers
and data threatened the administration of “bureaucratic justice.”57 In particular,
the “seductively precise” conclusions of machines function as objective criteria
that lessen the perceived need for subjective judgments by people.58 Computers,
as deployed by the government, resist accountability and rob participants of their
dignity, largely by removing their capacity to understand the processes to which
they have been subjected.59
Twenty years prior, Laurence Tribe famously dismissed Bayesian
approaches to evidence as “trial by mathematics.”60 Tracing a line between the
practice of numerology in the Middle Ages and the American reverence for
statistics in the 1970s, Tribe walked through the various problems associated
with introducing probabilistic evidence into court to establish facts.61 Tribe cast
mathematics as the original black box, incapable of deep scrutiny by the trier of
fact.62 He noted the varied ways mathematical formulas seduce the unfamiliar
juror or judge into a perception of objectivity.63 Tribe bemoaned the
dehumanizing changes mathematical methods bring to the very “character of the
trial process itself.”64
Each of these issues is, or should be, relevant today.65 Schwartz’s case
studies of family aid and child welfare enforcement mirror almost precisely the
case studies animating Automating Inequality, a celebrated book from 2017.66
The very issue that sparked the trial-by-mathematics debate—a prosecutor’s
efforts in People v. Collins to link an interracial couple to a crime using
statistics67—closely parallels the now infamous ProPublica story on racial bias

56

Schwartz supra note 34, at 1324–25.
See generally id. (citing JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983)).
58
Id. at 1335, 1341–43.
59
Id. at 1348–49, 1372, 1376, 1378–79.
60
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329 (1971).
61
Id. at 1329.
62
Id. at 1393.
63
Id. at 1331–32.
64
Id. at 1375.
65
Substitute “algorithm” for “math,” and “Trial by Algorithm” could easily appear as a title in a future
volume of the Harvard Law Review. You’re welcome to the title.
66
EUBANKS, supra note 37, at 180–88.
67
People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 39–40 (Cal. 1968)
57
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in algorithmic risk assessment for sentencing.68 Whatever its antecedents, the
puzzle of how changes in technology interact with the dispensation of justice is
once again timely and critical.
Our specific focus here is the administrative state’s turn toward automation.
To date, this conversation has tended to foreground procedural due process—
i.e., the process the state owes individuals before depriving them of life, liberty,
or property69—as well as challenges to rulemaking and open-sunshine
commitments.70
Schwartz, in 1991, focused on the ways that computer and data-driven
decision-making thwarted values, such as privacy, justice, and autonomy.71
Years later, one of us (Citron) highlighted the mismatch behind the automated
state and procedural guarantees, arguing for a new form of “technological due
process” that would restore accountability and transparency to the system.72 This
work observed, for instance, that the Matthews calculus for due process was illsuited to automated systems because it assumed that interventions would be
cheap in the individual instance but expensive at scale.73 In reality, a deep vetting
of agency software is expensive at the front end but the benefits propagate across
the entire system at the back end. Such vetting is crucial because programming
mistakes constituted an ultra vires assumption of rulemaking power without
legally required notice and public participation.74
Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, in 2014, explore the prospect of
“procedural data due process” to mitigate the tendency of data-driven analyses
to “evade or marginalize traditional privacy protections and frameworks.”75
Crawford and Schultz draw from history, scholarship, and precedent to identify
the elements of a fair hearing, seeking to translate those commitments into a
world rife with analytics.76 More recent work by Crawford and Schultz focuses
on accountability for third-party vendors, suggesting that algorithms and
68
Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically Inevitable, Researchers
Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016, 4:44 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-ismathematically-inevitable-researchers-say.
69
Citron, supra note 13, at 1281.
70
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence
Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1464–65 (2011).
71
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 1386.
72
Citron, supra note 13, at 1313; Citron, supra note 20, at 355–57.
73
Citron, supra note 13, at 1284–86.
74
Id. at 1279.
75
Kate Crawford & Jason Shultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive
Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 93, 109 (2014).
76
Id. at 111–21.
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artificial intelligence be considered state action for purposes of constitutional
challenges.77
Joshua Kroll and an interdisciplinary team of co-authors, noted above, decry
the disconnect between decision-making systems—such as the algorithmic
processes used by the IRS to select whom to audit or by immigration authorities
to distribute visas—and the accountability mechanism that purport to govern
them.78 They explore techniques by which “authorities can demonstrate . . . that
automated decisions comply with key standards of legal fairness.”79 They offer
“procedural regularity,” which partly draws upon “the Fourteenth Amendment
principle of procedural due process,” as the guiding principle for the redesign of
agency systems.80
Recent work by Deirdre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger thinks
systematically about “procurement as policy,” whereby agencies hide policy
changes in harder-to-review decisions about the purchase of machine learning
systems.81 According to the authors, “these systems frequently displace
discretion previously held by either policymakers charged with ordering that
discretion, or individual front-end government employees on whose judgment
governments previously relied.”82 Mulligan and Bamberger offer a variety of
techniques to reintroduce the human expertise, discretion, and political
accountability that machines have displaced.83
These wise interventions, and many more, proceed from the assumption that
the substitution of technology for people reduces transparency, accountability,
or some other legally mandated value.84 Constitutions and statutes, after all, were
written on the assumption that people, not machines, would make decisions and
execute most consequential tasks. Imagine, for example, a top presidential
candidate is a self-aware machine built in 2050. Would the Constitution, written

77

Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1941, 1971–72

(2019).
78

Kroll et al., supra note 40, at 633.
Id. at 637.
80
Id. at 656–57. The authors also explore technical means to assure fidelity to the “substantive policy
choice” of nondiscrimination. Id. at 678.
81
Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 25, at 789, 822. But see ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 15
(finding that “[c]ontrary to much of the literature’s fixation on the procurement of algorithms through private
contracting, over half of applications (84 use cases, or 53%) were built in-house”).
82
Id. at 778.
83
Id. at 822–33.
84
Id. at 788.
79
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by and about human beings, require that our robot wait to become president until
2085, making it the requisite thirty-five years of age?85
The substitution approach represents, in a sense, the legacy of the thinking
of cyberlaw pioneer Lawrence Lessig. The ascendance of the commercial
internet in the 1990s, which appeared to stand apart from existing social
structures, led early theorists to predict an end to authoritarianism.86 Lessig
famously rejected this premise, predicting instead that our collective mediation
by technology would shepherd in an era of exquisite control by governments and
firms as they come to understand the new levers of power.87
In making his case, Lessig developed at least two sets of ideas that continue
to guide law and technology analysis. First, Lessig postulated that law is only
one of four “modalities” of regulation available to powerful institutions to
channel behavior—markets, norms, and architecture also represent means of
exerting control.88 Even if a virtual or geographically dispersed community
cannot be reached directly by statutes or court orders, the community is
nevertheless governed by the software, hardware, and networks that constitute
their underlying architecture.89 Second, Lessig understood the interaction
between law and cyberspace as a function of “latent ambiguities,” i.e., legal
puzzles revealed only when a change in technology alters human habits and
capabilities.90 Although less remarked than Lessig’s mantra that “code is law,”
the notion that new technologies reveal latent ambiguities in the law informed a
generation of technology law scholars.91
Lessig’s approach was and remains groundbreaking; it is also deeply
intuitive to lawyers, already steeped in analogic reasoning and problem-solving.
We should not be surprised, therefore, to see the approach reflected across the

85
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen
Years a Resident within the United States.”). The example is adapted from Ryan Calo, Much Ado About Robots,
CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/04/11/ryan-calo/much-ado-about-robots.
86
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 4 (1999).
87
Id. at 6, 8.
88
Id.; see Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) (first articulating
the four modalities of regulation as law, norms, markets, and architecture).
89
Lessig, supra note 88, at 676.
90
LESSIG, supra note 86, at 22; see James H. Moor, What Is Computer Ethics?, 16 METAPHILOSOPHY
266, 269 (1985) (discussing how technology creates “policy vacuums”).
91
LESSIG, supra note 86, at 22.
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legal academy over the years.92 We certainly should not be surprised to see the
approach reflected in analyses of algorithms and artificial intelligence.
These technologies fascinate precisely for their ability to substitute for
humans. The law assumes that humans will drive cars. Now robots do. Scholars,
ourselves included, ask how we might reconstitute law, markets, norms, or
technology to address the myriad latent ambiguities revealed when things start
to act like people. There is the new practice that challenges existing legal
assumptions. There is the resolution by code or law that restores us to the status
quo. While there are certainly outliers, much law and technology scholarship
follows this basic pattern.
We aim to challenge this long-standing approach. The problem with the
substitution frame is twofold. By focusing on the specific guarantees that new
technology displaces, the substitution approach inevitably misses the
opportunity to reexamine first principles. Critics of algorithmic decision-making
have largely assumed the prospect of restoring the status quo through specific
alternations to legal and technical design, rather than foreground broader
questions of legitimacy.93
The substitution approach also fails to consider whether the existing status
quo is sufficient in light of new technical capabilities. Analyses of driverless car
liability have largely assumed that people would still own individual vehicles
but that they would not drive them.94 But the technologies that underpin
driverless cars could, for example, lead to a wholesale reexamination of mobility
and transportation.95 Perhaps the ascendance of artificial intelligence means that
agencies should be held to higher standards and asked to pursue greater or
different values.

92
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 358 (2003)
(addressing Fourth Amendment issues in cyberspace based on the work of Lawrence Lessig).
93
Cf. Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Where Fairness Fails: Data, Algorithms, and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Discourse, 22 J. INFO., COMMC’N. & SOC’Y. 900, 901 (2019) (arguing, in the context of
antidiscrimination, that explorations of algorithmic bias “have tended to admit, but place beyond the scope of
analysis, important structural and social concerns related to the realization of data justice”).
94
E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility
for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127, 169 (2019) (addressing a gap in tort
law occasioned by substituting machines for human drivers).
95
See Calo, supra note 39, at 87 (critiquing the professors’ assumption that autonomous transportation
would continue to involve individual vehicle ownership).
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II. JUSTIFYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
As the previous Part describes, challenges to agency automation tend to
admonish the government for supplanting procedural rights and values by
substituting a machine decision-maker for a human official. Recommendations
take the form of changes to law or design that restore the status quo ex ante by
reinstating the ability of subjects to understand, shape, and challenge the rules
and decisions to which they are subject.
What follows is an argument that, in addition to the valuable work of
restoring lapsed or eroded safeguards, critics should pull at the threads of the
arguments justifying the automated administrative state to assess whether the
entire tapestry unravels. That is a crucial missed opportunity, one we aim to
repair.
A. Responding to Agency Skepticism: Governance in a Complex World
American administrative agencies have faced skepticism almost from their
inception.96 The reasons for skepticism are heterogeneous and evolving. Charges
against agencies have run the gamut from overzealousness to bureaucratic
inefficiency to agency capture and politicization.97
But the deepest critique of the administrative state came early and never
left—namely, that administrative agencies by their very nature violate the text
and spirit of the Constitution in exercising and even commingling powers
committed to separate branches.98
There are distinct yet related aspects to this challenge. The first is that,
because the Constitution vests “all legislative powers” in a Congress, the
legislature is not free to delegate its authority to a separate body—a principle
96
See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civil Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1513 (1992). Note that in the discussion that follows, we are describing federal agencies and administrative
law. State agencies are subject to analogous if slightly different constraints. See Arthur Ear Bonfield, The Federal
APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 297 (1986) (“When the states developed their
administrative law, they adopted many of the general concepts embodied in the 1946 federal Administrative
Procedure Act.”). Meanwhile, the examples that animate this paper are, by and large, state agency examples
where existing litigation has focused on and generated a record. Our argument therefore makes at least one of
two speculative assumptions: (1) that the case for the legitimacy of state agencies mirrors that of federal
agencies, or (2) that the trend in automation at the federal level exemplifies similar dynamics at the state level.
97
E.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION 14–18 (1993); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 7–8 (2014).
98
Adrian Vermeule, The Administrative State: Law, Democracy, and Knowledge, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 259, 261 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber & Sanford Levinson eds.,
2015).
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known as nondelegation.99 The second concern is that, by vesting agencies with
the authority to make, enforce, and interpret rules, Congress violates the doctrine
of separation of powers implicit in the tripartite structure of government.100 Like
the mythological Fates who spin, measure, and cut, each branch of government
has a separate power than the other—the power to create, enforce, and interpret
law.101 Agencies by their nature elide these powers together.
Bolstering these concerns is the contested observation that agencies permit
Congress to insulate itself from political fallout.102 Rather than confront hard
policy choices squarely as part of an open political process, the existence of
agencies permits Congress to forward difficult decisions to the bureaucrats,
many of whom are career officials who are largely insulated from the mercurial
wrath of constituents.103 If the agency’s actions garner public approval, then
Congress and the President can claim credit. If the actions or inactions of the
agency garner scorn, Congress can distance itself from the decision and even
haul in the offending official for excoriation for good measure. Open agency
processes also become a lightning rod for special interests, who are then less
likely to trouble Congress with their complaints and demands.
Since 1935, when the Supreme Court struck down two broad delegations of
power to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration under the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, few nondelegation challenges have gotten
much traction.104 All the Constitution seems to require of Congress today is that
it lay down an “intelligible principle” in the agency’s organic statute that guides
agency action.105 Such a principle can be broad indeed: the Federal Trade
99

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
Gillian E. Metzger, Delegation, Accommodation, and the Permeability of Constitutional and Ordinary
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 98, at 422.
101
The Fates or “Moirai” are physical manifestations of the concept of destiny that appear in HESIOD,
THEOGONY and elsewhere as part of Greco-Roman lore.
102
SCHOENBROD, supra note 97, at 17. For a well-known counterpoint, see Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation:
Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 81, 87 (1984).
103
SCHOENBROD, supra note 97, at 9.
104
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935). Supreme Court case law also prohibits Congress from using administrative
constructs to reserve for itself a power the Constitution does not commit to it (e.g., appointment), limiting the
constitutionally assigned power of another branch (e.g., removal), or bypassing a constitutional mandate (e.g.,
bicameralism and presentment). Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957, 959 (1983).
105
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). Changes in the composition of the Supreme Court, especially the appointment
of noted delegation skeptic Justice Brett Kavanaugh, may eventually lead the Court to reexamine this doctrine.
If this occurs, a return to professionalism in Congress will be all the more important; even those federal
lawmakers more accustomed to grandstanding will need to invest time and energy into the project of lawmaking,
getting into the weeds of legislative policy with career staff. See Jonathan Rauch, The War on
100
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Commission Act charges the FTC with policing against “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices.”106 Congress need only provide the agency with an adequate sense
of its will and expectations and agency officials are off and running. For present
purposes, the precise contours of the intelligible principle test are less interesting
than the rationale for upholding what is today a massive administrative state
touching most aspects of daily life.
Proponents of agencies then and now have countered skeptics with great
force.107 Some note that while the Constitution does not endorse the
establishment of (many) agencies, nor does it expressly forbid them.108 Nearly
all proponents draw from a similar set of positive justifications for the
administrative state that ultimately found support in Supreme Court precedent.
Foremost among these justifications is that managing the modern world is
beyond the institutional capability of Congress alone.109 Agencies are
anomalous but necessary because the world is more complex and dynamic than
the framers might have imagined.110
Several related insights follow. Congress must obtain assistance from
another entity to carry out its statutorily committed responsibilities. Protecting
the Jews of Prague was beyond the capacity of the Rabbi ben Bezalel; legend
has it that he had to fashion a golem.111 The entity Congress creates must be
positioned to accrue adequate expertise to manage a complex industry,
challenge, or societal environment. And the entity must have sufficient
flexibility—indeed, the discretion—to individuate its policies by context and
respond to changes on the ground in our dynamic, contemporary world.
The Supreme Court has endorsed each of these precepts on multiple
occasions. Famously in Mistretta v. United States, the Court announced: “our
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical

Professionalization, NAT’L AFFS., vol. 46 (2021), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-waron-professionalism.
106
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
107
See Mashaw, supra note 102; Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
713, 715 (1969).
108
Davis, supra note 107, at 719.
109
Id. at 715.
110
See Metzger, supra note 100, at 412. For example, the second Congress decided it needed to choose
where post offices would be built. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. VII, § 1, 1 Stat. 232.
111
RICHARD BURTON, PRAGUE: A CULTURAL AND LITERARY HISTORY 62–69 (2003). The golem was
powerful but beholden to the will of the Rabbi, who was able to return his creation to clay following the
completion of its task. Id.
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problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives.”112
The functionalist position has clear intuitive appeal. Congress is comprised
of a few hundred representatives and their staff. For the legislature not only to
become expert in railway travel, disease control, or nuclear energy, but also to
keep up with changes in these fields and deal with exceptions or special
circumstances, seems far beyond any single body’s institutional capacity.
Rather, Congress must be permitted to create a series of entities, each capable of
mastering a particular domain and of making informed choices within that
context. Indeed, the position must have clear intuitive appeal, given that the
Constitution just as clearly vests “All legislative Powers herein granted” in
Congress.113
The allowances sanctioning the administrative state emerged against an
important backdrop of structural safeguards. In 1946, in reaction to the explosion
of agency activity under FDR during the New Deal, reformers in Congress
crafted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as a compromise.114 This
statute lays out the structure under which federal agencies must operate, and it
provides instructions to the courts on how to review agency actions.115 Many
agency activities fly under the radar of administrative law as non-binding. These
include reports, convenings, and myriad other actions that have no direct impact
on the primary conduct (behavior) of regulated entities or the public. But when
agencies act upon the world or bind their own conduct in particular ways, they
are subject to procedural constraints and open their actions to judicial review.
The APA provides for two major means of binding agency action:
(1) rulemaking, whereby the agency formulates prospective regulations, and
(2) adjudications, whereby the agency applies those rules to particular regulated
entities.116 Most rulemaking and adjudication are conceptually “informal” and
hence it is up to agency, largely in its discretion, to set out the procedures.117 But
even so, Congress and the courts generally require agencies making rules to
solicit stakeholder comments on those rules and provide detailed explanations
112

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
114
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 519, 523–24
(1978) (describing the origins of the APA).
115
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59. The APA has remained nearly unchanged
over six decades, although it was amended to include a transparency provision known as the Freedom of
Information Act. Id. at § 552.
116
Id. at §§ 553, 554.
117
Id. at § 553.
113
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of their bases.118 Similarly, agency adjudications must satisfy the strictures of
due process and generate a sufficient record so as to be subject to meaningful
judicial review.119
Judicial review of administrative actions is highly complex. The inquiry
involves a blend of common law, constitutional law, and statutory
interpretation.120 Broadly speaking, courts defer to agency interpretations of
their own organic statutes unless congressional will is clear, the agency’s
interpretation is unreasonable, or deference is otherwise inappropriate.121 Courts
give arguably greater deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own duly
promulgated regulations, which generally will control unless clearly
erroneous.122
Under the APA, the DNA of the federal administrative state, courts defer to
agency fact-finding as well as reasoning in arriving at a decision unless it is
unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise arbitrary or capricious.123
Where an agency has expertise but no clear enforcement authority, courts are
nevertheless obliged to give extra weight to the interpretation according to its
persuasiveness.124 Courts even defer to agencies on whether additional process,
due under the Fifth Amendment, is helpful or burdensome—despite a general
commitment to review constitutional questions de novo: “In assessing what
process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith
judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of
social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair
consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals.”125
Riddled with caveats and nuances (and a headache for law students), these
standards of deference constitute Administrative Law 101. The primary
justification for such deference is very similar to the justification of the
administrative state as a whole: agency expertise.126 Courts presume that the
118
Id. at § 552 (requiring notice, comment, and statement); see Citron, supra note 13, at 1288–89
(discussing how software undermines informal rulemaking).
119
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 420 (1971).
120
Noga Morag-Levine, Agency Statutory Interpretation and the Rule of Common Law, 2009 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 51, 65–66.
121
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
122
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Recently the Supreme Court placed limits on Auer,
precluding greater deference absent genuine ambiguity, and then only where the agency has relevant expertise
and has exercised appropriate judgment. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
123
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
124
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
125
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
126
Stiglitz, supra note 46, at 635, 645.
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agencies are experts in designated policy areas whereas courts are not.127 That
argument is fortified by the notion that courts owe deference to agencies because
they are entrusted, given their expertise, to fulfill congressional mandates.128 The
very reason that Congress can transfer its authority under the Constitution to
another technical body is, again, the agencies’ particular ability to accrue
expertise and respond with flexibility and precision to specific problems.129

B. Deference to Algorithms?
Much scholarship questions the legality of agency actions using algorithms.
Very little work to date interrogates the ongoing sufficiency of the justifications
underpinning the automated administrative state. Work by one of us (Citron) has
addressed the impact of automation on notice and choice requirements in agency
rulemaking and public participation generally.130 Technological Due Process
began the work of conceptualizing automated systems as “de facto delegations
of rulemaking power,” arguing that agencies in essence re-delegate their
Congressional authority to computer programmers.131 And the paper noted—
with great concern—the irony that the inevitable changes to policy that come
from effectively rewriting written laws via automation should be entitled to zero
deference from courts but in practice will be largely unreviewable.132
A recent paper instead defends the use of certain tools by agencies in select
contexts as consistent with the APA. Cary Coglianese and David Lehr “consider
how nonhuman decision tools would have to be used to comport with the
nondelegation doctrine and with rules about due process, antidiscrimination, and
governmental transparency.”133 The authors dismiss the concern over delegation
on the apparent basis that the necessity of setting an “objective function,” or
goal,134 for machine learning systems means that there will always be an
“intelligible principle”135 in the constitutional sense, and that algorithms lack
self-interest, such that delegating to machines differs from delegating to private
parties.136

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 647.
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)).
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
See Citron, supra note 13.
Id. at 1294, 1296.
Id. at 1299–1300.
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 30, at 1154.
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1180.
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We question whether an objective function, in the sense of an arbitrary goal
the system seeks to maximize, bears the slightest resemblance to an intelligible
principle directed at agency officials. Yet Coglianese and Lehr’s analysis is most
interesting for what it omits. The authors analyze machine learning under a
doctrine developed to ascertain whether delegations to people pass constitutional
muster.137 They do not appear to question whether re-delegating authority to
machines in ways that jettison expertise and discretion might undermine the vary
rationale for delegation. Said another way, Coglianese and Lehr appear to
conflate the test itself for the reasons behind it.
Mulligan and Bamberger come to a different conclusion than Coglianese and
Lehr. Their recent paper focuses on the ways government adoption of new
technology—particularly the artificial intelligence technique of machine
learning—undermines key democratic elements of administrative
governance.138 Citing one of us (Citron), they note that policymaking requires
notice and comment, which procurement of software systems appears to end
run.139 The authors emphasize in particular the “foundational principle that
decisions of substance must not be arbitrary or capricious”140—a standard
located in the APA.141 The systems the U.S. government is increasingly
procuring yield results that no human can justify.
These few works appear to constitute the entirety of the conversation to date
regarding the legitimacy of the automated state as a matter of first principles.142
Normatively, each work grounds its force in meeting or failing to meet a
doctrinal or statutory requirement.
We believe more needs to be said regarding the fundamental legitimacy
concerns raised by automation. We do not expect or hope to be the final word
on this issue. Quite the opposite: Our purpose is to marshal argument and
evidence sufficient to touch off a discussion of whether the automated
administrative state is headed for a legitimacy crisis. We see reason to think that
it is.

137

Id. at 1154.
See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 25, at 780–82.
139
Id. at 814, 816.
140
Id. at 804.
141
5 U.S.C. § 706.
142
Supreme Court of California Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar discusses the trade-offs involved in
delegating agency decisions to machines. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Cyberdelegation and the Administrative
State (Stanford Pub. L., Working Paper No. 2754385, 2016). He problematizes delegation but does not go so far
as to question the theoretical footing or justification of the administrative state. Id. at 2–3.
138
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III. THE LOOMING LEGITIMACY CRISIS
The administrative state has been justified for over a century in a particular
way. The argument that automation is eroding agency legitimacy is conceptual
and empirical. The conceptual component is straightforward. If the
administrative state represents a constitutional anomaly justified by scholars and
courts in light of the unique affordances of bureaucracies—namely, the accrual
of expertise, the potential for individuation and rapid response, and the exercise
of discretion—then the absence of these qualities undermines that justification.
This is especially so where the structural safeguards that discipline
administrative power are being eroded by the same machine processes. We make
this argument at length below.
The empirical question is different. The empirical question asks whether and
to what extent agencies are, in fact, throwing away expertise and discretion.
Historically this has not been an easy question to answer. And it remains
difficult, given the protections of trade secrets,143 the nuances of “policy by
procurement,”144 and the vagaries of administrative law.145 Yet, in recent years,
important gaps have been filled. Litigation across the country in a diverse array
of administrative contexts has revealed a common pattern: agencies do not
understand and cannot control the machines to which they have delegated their
authority.
A. Lessons from Litigation
Due to the courage and diligence of lawyers all over the country, we are in
a better position today than in recent memory to understand the pathologies of
agency automation and its betrayal of the presumption of agency expertise and
flexibility. In the decade since the publication of Technological Due Process,
governments have doubled down on automation despite its widening
problems.146 The state’s embrace of automation, however, has not gone
unchallenged, for the good of impacted individuals and scholarly evaluation of
the corrosion of expertise, flexibility, and nimbleness in agency action.
143
See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1377–95 (2018).
144
Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 25, at 779–80.
145
Sovereign immunity entitles the government to set the terms of when and if agencies are sued. See
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 152–53 (1993). The APA waives immunity for some nonmonetary (i.e.,
equitable) relief but subject to extensive requirements including finality, ripeness, and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. See id.
146
Harry Surden, Values Embedded in Legal Artificial Intelligence (U. of Colo. L. Legal Stud., Working
Paper, No. 17-17, 2017).
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Automation has not been as clear a win for governmental efficiency and
fairness as administrators had hoped and as vendors have claimed. It has not
eliminated bias but rather traded the possibility of human bias for the guarantee
of systemic bias.147 Prior failures have not informed present efforts. Instead,
problems have multiplied, diversified, and ossified. Government has expanded
automation despite clear warnings about potential pitfalls. Agencies have
continued to use relatively straightforward rules-based systems despite their
obvious flaws.148 More troublingly, they have adopted even more complex and
even more varied efforts at automated decision-making despite having no
evidence that the tech even works—they’re proceeding without proof of
concept. The stakes couldn’t be higher.149
Automation has misallocated public resources,150 denied individualized
process, and exacted significant costs on individuals.151 Automated systems are
hardly engines of efficiency. To the extent that they are predictable, it is in their
misdirection of government services. They impair individualized process,
making decisions about individuals without notice and a chance to be heard152
and embedding rules that lack democratic imprimatur.153 They create instability
and uncertainty that upends people’s lives. And they mask difficult policy
choices. If agencies want to make policy choices like cutting care for certain
types of beneficiaries, they ought to say so rather than burying the problem in
an automated system.
In courts across the country, attorneys have challenged government
automation’s pathologies in varied arenas, including public benefits, jobs, childwelfare, airline travel, and criminal sentencing. Litigation has forced some

147

Lecher, supra note 1.
Id.
149
Surden, supra note 146.
150
Citron, supra note 13, at 1269.
151
Lecher, supra note 1.
152
See, e.g., Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that Michigan’s public benefits
system erroneously terminated food assistance benefits of more than 20,000 individuals based on a crude data
matching algorithm in violation of due process guarantees); Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 892
(6th Cir. 2019) (lawsuit against companies involved in creation of flawed software that erroneously terminated
unemployment benefits of thousands of Michigan residents); Ryan Felton, Lawsuit Challenging Michigan
Unemployment Fraud Cases Moves Forward, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://www.
metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2016/03/30/lawsuit-challenging-michigan-unemployment-fraud-casesmoves-forward (describing a federal lawsuit alleging the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System violates
equal protection and due process).
153
See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336, 344–45 (Ark. 2017) (finding a
substantial likelihood Arkansas Department of Human Services failed to provide proper notice under the APA
when promulgating automated reassessment system).
148
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government agencies to address glaring problems, but others persist.154 Because
challenges to systems have wrought ad hoc rather than systemic change, we have
only begun to discover the pathologies of the automated administrative state.
Then, too, litigation offers a limited set of tools—it can only address violations
of laws or constitutional commitments already enshrined in law.
The litigation highlighted shows how far away we have moved from the
animating reasons for agency delegation. It demonstrates that automation has
led to the adoption of inexpert tools that waste government resources and deny
individuals any meaningful form of due process. As the lawsuits discussed show,
automated systems create chaos rather than providing more nimble and flexible
responses.
We have already mentioned the ill-fated system adopted by the Arkansas
Department of Human Services (DHS). In Arkansas, as in other states,
physically disabled Medicaid recipients can opt to live at home with state-funded
care in lieu of residing in a nursing facility.155 Prior to 2016, registered nurses
determined the home care services available to Medicaid recipients.156 Nurses
interviewed recipients and filled out a 286-question survey to determine a
person’s hours of weekly home care, with a maximum of fifty-six hours per
week.157
In 2016, Arkansas DHS replaced nurse evaluations with algorithmic
decisions. According to DHS administrators, computers would be cheaper and
would not play favorites as nurses might.158 DHS turned to the nonprofit
coalition InterRAI, which licenses its “Resource Utilization Group system”
(RUGs) to agencies across the country.159 In the DHS system, the RUGs
154

See id. at 345.
ARChoices In Homecare Home and Community-Based Waiver, 016-06 ARK. CODE R. 075,
§§ 211.000, 213.210 (LexisNexis 2020); see Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 3, Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs., No. 60cv-17-442 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cnty. Jan. 31, 2017). Home care in Arkansas is on average $18,000 per year, whereas
a nursing home would cost the state $50,000 per year. Marci Manley, Working 4 You: Explaining the Formula
for Care Claimed to Cause Cuts to Needy, KARK NEWS 4 (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:36 PM), https://www.kark.com/
news/working-4-you-explaining-the-formula-for-care-claimed-to-cause-cuts-to-needy/.
156
016-06 ARK. CODE R. 075, § 212.300(D)(6) (LexisNexis 2020); Alternatives for Adults with Physical
Disabilities Waiver, 016-06 ARK. CODE R. 18, § 212.200(E) (LexisNexis 2020). See Manley, supra note 155.
157
See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 15, Ledgerwood, No. 60-cv-17-442.
158
Lecher, supra note 1. DHS Administrator Craig Cloud told a local news station that the RUGs
algorithm “uses objective standards” and renders “consistent decisions.” See Formula for Care, supra note 95.
159
Lecher, supra note 1. InterRAI’s algorithms “are used in health settings in nearly half of the US states,
as well as in other countries.” Id. InterRAI has a contract with DHS. The nonprofit’s President Brant Fries serves
as the principal investigator on that contract. Excerpted Transcript of Trial, supra note 10, at 3. Fries built an
155
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algorithm sorted physically disabled Medicaid recipients into categories (or
tiers) through a complex series of classifications and statistical calculations.160
A software vendor hired by DHS then operationalized the decisions.161 The
vendor used the RUGs algorithm to calculate the number of hours of care
allocated to individuals on a weekly basis.162 Medicaid recipients, once sorted
into a tier, could not be moved to another tier even if their needs changed.163
Once in effect, the new system produced arbitrary and illogical results.164 If
a person was a foot amputee, the RUGs algorithm indicated that the person
“didn’t have any [foot] problems” even though the lack of the limb meant that
they needed more assistance rather than less.165 It ignored crucial facts about
individuals, such as their ability to walk, frequency of falls, and history of
incontinence.166 It failed to account for the severity of individuals’ conditions
even though DHS regulations required an account of such distinctions.167 For
instance, the “algorithm allocates someone with quadriplegia, dementia, and
schizophrenia the same care as someone who just has quadriplegia, even though
the dementia and schizophrenia likely mean that more care time is needed.”168
Kevin De Liban, counsel for Legal Aid of Arkansas, astutely coined the phrase
“algorithmic absurdities” to capture these developments.169

initial version of RUGs pursuant to a seven-million-dollar grant from the U.S. Government. Id. at 8. The DHS
system uses the RUG III home version, which was written in January 2009. Id. at 10–11.
160
See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Ark. 2017). To say that the
RUGs algorithm is complex understates the point. The testimony of Fries demonstrates the point. Excerpted
Transcript of Trial, supra note 10, at 11–19, 26 (“[W]e use some fairly sophisticated statistical capability to
say . . . . [W]hat explains that this person costs more than that person. . . . the statistical software looks through
thousands of possibilities and says this is the best one.”). Fries noted, “You have to understand, there’s a lot of
code here. It’s a complicated algorithm . . . . there’s 17 pages of code. . . . Someone took this code, which is
written in a very basic language that any programmer can understand, but someone has to take this logic and
translate it into whatever the software is that the vendor uses.” Id. at 51.
161
Excerpted Transcript of Trial, supra note 10, at 51.
162
Id. at 49.
163
Id. at 57.
164
Lecher, supra note 1.
165
Id.
166
Memorandum from Kevin De Liban, supra note 5, at 3.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Lecher, supra note 1. Kevin De Liban did what no DHS official could do. When DHS officials were
stating publicly that they could not explain why the algorithm operated as it did, De Liban decoded its decisions
by comparing the code and master assessment handbook with the cases of more than 150 people who sought his
help. Telephone Interview with Kevin De Liban, supra note 9. Through that process, De Liban found countless
problems, including the ones described above. Id. There could have been far more, but De Liban worked with
the clients that he had to discover the problems that he did. Id.
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In 2016, De Liban sued DHS in federal court on behalf of physically disabled
Arkansas residents whose home care had been reduced an average of 43% after
the adoption of RUGs.170 For one Medicaid recipient, aid was cut more than
53%.171 The algorithmic system left severely disabled Medicaid recipients alone
without access to food, toilet, and medicine for hours on end.172 Approximately
47% of Arkansas Medicaid recipients were negatively impacted.173
The author of the RUGs algorithm, Brant Fries, testified at trial.174 During
cross-examination, De Liban asked Fries to conduct a manual check of plaintiff
Ethel Jacobs’s case.175 As the author of the algorithm, Fries was uniquely
situated to compare how the code should work and how it actually worked.176
What Fries found—and what the state’s counsel sheepishly admitted—was that
the RUGs system had made “a mistake” in Jacobs’s case.177 Plaintiffs’ counsel
summed up plaintiffs’ position:
[W]e’re gratified that DHS has reported the error and certainly happy
it’s been found, but that almost proves the point of the case. There’s
this immensely complex system around which no standards have been
published, so that no one in their agency caught it until we initiated
federal litigation and spent hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars
to get here today.178

Fries admitted that there were likely other mistakes as yet undetected in the
system but offered no systemic method capable of detecting and addressing
them.179
De Liban prevailed in court. A federal judge permanently enjoined DHS
from automating home care decisions until it could explain the reasons behind

170
As De Liban told us, he relied on the arguments in Technological Due Process, see Citron, supra note
13, in drafting his complaint. Telephone Interview with Kevin De Liban, supra note 9.
171
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 16, Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs. (2017) (No. 60CV-17-442), at 16 (Cir. Ct.
Pulaski Cnty. May 14, 2018).
172
Memorandum Order at 7, Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs., No. 60CV-17-442 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski
Cnty. May 14, 2018).
173
Telephone Interview with Kevin De Liban, supra note 9 (discussing federal lawsuit concerning the
Home Community Based Program).
174
Excerpted Transcript of Trial, supra note 10, at 21–22.
175
Id. at 21.
176
Id. at 21–22 (“DHS is using a system to sort these folks into 23 categories. That is what Dr. Fries can
tell us about, is what it takes. And our claim around due process is—implicates what knowledge is available
about how people get sorted.”).
177
Id. at 36.
178
Id. at 37–38.
179
Id.
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the decisions.180 After DHS failed to suspend its use of the algorithmic system
in 2017, De Liban sued the agency in state court, seeking to enjoin its operation
on the grounds that its adoption had violated the state’s Administrative
Procedure Act.181 A state judge ordered DHS to stop using the RUGs algorithm
because the agency failed to follow the state’s rulemaking procedures.182 During
the rulemaking process, DHS failed to explain that human decision-makers
would be replaced with an automated system.183
The Arkansas litigation sheds light on the pathologies of today’s algorithmic
decision-making systems. Agencies continue to struggle with how to give
meaningful notice about a computer’s decisions. Despite a decade of experience,
for example, we have not yet figured out how to provide notice about automated
decisions.184
To be clear, Arkansas is not the only state bedeviled by such “algorithmic
absurdities.” Idaho’s health and welfare agency built its own budget software
tool to allocate the number of hours of home care for disabled Medicaid
recipients.185 That algorithmic tool drastically cut individuals’ home care hours
without explanation.186 The ACLU asked the agency to account for their clients’
change in benefits.187 An answer never arrived. The reason? The algorithm was
a “trade secret.”188

180

Order at 1–2, Estate of Jacobs, 2017 WL 2960793.
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs. (2017) (No. 60CV-17-442), at 18, 24 (Cir. Ct.
Pulaski Cnty. May 14, 2018).
182
Memorandum Order at 6, Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs., No. 60 CV-17-442 (Ark. Cir. Ct.
May 14, 2018).
183
Id.; Telephone Interview with Kevin De Liban, supra note 9. DHS sought to do an end run around that
ruling, issuing an “emergency” rule saying that it was absolved of having to go through a rulemaking process.
The trial court found the effort “manifestly preposterous” and “disobedient” and granted the plaintiffs’ motion
for contempt. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 571 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Ark. 2019) (“Effective
immediately, the proposed promulgating emergency rule is hereby enjoined, not based on any new action. It is
enjoined as a deliberate and calculated disobedience of the permanent injunction entered by this court on May
14, 2018.”).
184
Lecher, supra note 1 (quoting Fries as acknowledging that he doesn’t have best practices on how to
give notice on how algorithms work and it is “something we should do”).
185
K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 708 (D. Idaho 2016).
186
Jay Stanley, Pitfalls of Artificial Intelligence Decisionmaking Highlighted in Idaho ACLU Case, ACLU
(June 2, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/pitfalls-artificial-intelligence-decisionmakinghighlighted-idaho-aclu-case.
187
Id.
188
Stanley, supra note 186. See generally Wexler, supra note 143, at 1377–95 (describing the evolution
and application of trade secret privilege).
181
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The ACLU sued the health agency for injunctive and declaratory relief.189
The lawsuit alleged that the agency violated plaintiffs’ due process rights and
that its new decision-making tool produced arbitrary results.190 According to
plaintiffs’ experts, the system was built on incomplete data and “fundamental
statistical flaws.”191 During discovery, the ACLU deposed agency employees
about their construction of the algorithmic system.192 As plaintiffs’ counsel
recounts, “everybody pointed a finger at somebody else.”193 During the
depositions, employees claimed that others were responsible: “[E]ventually[,]
everybody was pointing around in a circle.”194
The court sided with plaintiffs. The court found that the budget tool’s
unreliability “arbitrarily deprive[d] participants of their property rights and
hence violate[d] due process.”195 As the court explained, the agency built the
tool based on flawed and incomplete information.196 More than 18% of the
records used to build the tool “contained incomplete or unbelievable
information.”197 The court noted that the agency adopted the budget software
though it knew up to 15% of recipients would not receive adequate funding.198
The agency knew the software needed to be recalculated but failed to do so, and
it never checked to determine how many participants were allocated insufficient
funds.199
The court urged the parties to “agree to a plan to improve the [budget
software] tool and institute regular testing to ensure its accuracy.”200 The agency
needed to test the tool to ensure its accuracy and establish a “robust appeals
process where the inevitable errors can be corrected.”201 The court further found
that the notice provided to recipients violated due process because it gave
recipients no explanation for the cut in benefits so that they could not challenge
the reduction.202

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

K.W., 180 F. Supp. 3d at 703.
Id.
Stanley, supra note 186.
Id.
Id.
Id.
K.W., 180 F. Supp. 3d at 718.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 720.
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Opaque algorithms decide whether public employees can keep their jobs and
provide little way for employees to understand why or to protest the decision.
Cities and states use algorithmic systems to evaluate public school teachers.203
Typically, those systems known as “value-added appraisal” systems are built by
private vendors.204 The algorithms compare test scores of students at the
beginning and end of a school year as a way to measure the students’ progress
and supposedly are
adjusted to try to account for factors other than teacher effectiveness,
such as socioeconomic status, that might be responsible for the
students’ progress or lack thereof. The adjusted results for the students
that are taught by a particular teacher are then used to produce an
evaluation of that teacher’s effectiveness.205

This is teacher evaluation by black-box algorithm—teachers can’t discern the
factors for evaluation, let alone the reason for the ultimate findings.
Starting in 2011, a Houston school district used a “value-added” appraisal
system provided by a private vendor, SAS Analytics Inc., to assess teacher
performance.206 The system measured teacher efficacy by endeavoring to track
the teacher’s impact on student test scores over time.207 Generally speaking, a
teacher’s algorithmic score was based on comparing the average growth of
student test scores of the particular teacher compared to the statewide average.208
The score was converted to a test statistic called the “Teacher Gain Index,”
which classified teachers into five levels of performance, ranging from “well
above” to “well below” average.209
Initially used to determine teacher bonuses, the algorithmic system was used
to sanction employees for low student performance on standardized tests.210 In
2012, the school district declared a goal of ensuring that “no more than 15% of
teachers with ratings of ineffective are retained.”211 It followed suit—by 2014,
approximately 25% of “ineffective teachers were ‘exited.’”212

203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 52, at 103.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150–51.
Hous. Fed’n. of Teachers. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1172 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
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The teachers’ union sued the school district on due process grounds, arguing
that the teachers could not examine the algorithm to challenge its accuracy.213
Plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin the school district’s use of the scores in
the termination or nonrenewal of contracts, a constitutionally protected property
interest.214 The court found a due process violation because teachers had no way
to replicate and challenge their scores.215
The court noted its concern about the algorithm’s accuracy. As the court
pointed out, the school district never verified or audited the system.216 The court
noted that “when a public agency adopts a policy of making high stakes
employment decisions based on secret algorithms incompatible with minimum
due process, the proper remedy is to overturn the policy, while leaving the trade
secrets intact.”217
As the court underscored and as the defendant conceded, scores might
contain errors, including data entry mistakes and code glitches, which will not
be promptly corrected.218 The court explained that “[a]lgorithms are human
creations, and subject to error like any human endeavor.”219 The court expressed
concern that the entire system was fraught with inaccuracies given the “houseof-cards fragility of the EVAAS system”—the “wrong score of a single teacher
could alter the scores of every other teacher in the district.”220 Thus, “the
accuracy of one score hinges upon the accuracy of all.”221
In a challenge brought by a public school teacher in New York, a state trial
court found that the value-added appraisal model was arbitrary and capricious.222
The court highlighted the biases and statistical shortcomings of the system and
noted the lack of transparency such that the plaintiff could not understand what
she needed to do to achieve a satisfactory score.223

213

Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1174.
215
Id. at 1180.
216
Id. at 1177.
217
Id. at 1179.
218
Id. at 1177.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 1178.
221
Id. The court dismissed the substantive due process claim because the “loose constitutional standard of
rationality allows government to use blunt tools which may produce marginal results.” Id. at 1182. The court
explained that the algorithmic scoring system would pass muster under the rationality inquiry even if they are
accurate only a little over half of the time. Id.
222
Lederman v. King, No. 5443-14, slip op. at 26416 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 10, 2016).
223
Id.
214
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Michigan’s unemployment benefits system is another case in point. Before
2013, the Michigan Unemployment Agency had 1,200 staffers who oversaw
unemployment claims. Staffers relied on a legacy IT system to administer claims
and to check for fraud.224 In 2011, the Michigan legislature eliminated the
requirement that the state’s Unemployment Insurance Agency (Agency) obtain
a court order before seizing a claimant’s wages, tax refunds, and bank funds.225
The Agency seized on the chance to replace its system with a fully automated
one.226 According to officials, an automated system would enhance efficiency
by eliminating 400 jobs, or one-third of the Agency’s staff.227 It promised to
identify fraudulent employment filings efficiently.228
The Agency spent close to $45 million on the Michigan Integrated Data
Automated System (MiDAS), working with a vendor to build the system.229
MiDAS went live in October 2013.230 In short order, the number of persons
accused of unemployment fraud “grew fivefold in comparison to the average
number found using the old system.”231 In two years, more than 34,000—up to
50,000—people were accused of fraud.232 Only 7% of those thousands of
individuals had actually committed fraud.233
MiDAS charged those accused a 400% penalty of the claimed amount of
fraud plus penalties and interest.234 Once claims were substantiated through a
flimsy notice process, MiDAS garnished the wages, tax refunds, and bank
accounts of the accused.235 In its first year, MiDAS generated $69 million in
fines from alleged fraud, up from $3 million the year before.236 Michigan

224
Robert N. Charette, Michigan’s MiDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm Alchemy Created Lead, Not
Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/computing/software/
michigans-midas-unemployment-system-algorithm-alchemy-that-created-lead-not-gold.
225
See id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.; see also Memorandum from H. Luke Shaefer, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Mich., & Steve Grey,
Gen. Manager, Mich. Unemployment Ins. Project, to Gay Gilbert, Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (May 19, 2015)
(available at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/Shae
fer-Gray-USDOL-Memo_06-01-2015.pdf).
232
Id.
233
Jack Lessenberry, State Unemployment Computer Had Anything but the Golden Touch, TRAVERSE
CITY REC. EAGLE (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.record-eagle.com/opinion/columns/jack-lessenberry-stateunemployment-computer-had-anything-but-the-golden/article_c03418a5-41a3-5b87-9663-9d4cfc42591c.html.
234
Charette, supra note 224.
235
Id.
236
Id.
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lawmakers have promised to seek at least $30 million in compensation for those
falsely accused.237
If MiDAS identified discrepancies between information provided by
claimants and information accessible to the system including employer and state
agency records, then it would find fraud.238 MiDAS also “flagged claimants
through an ‘income spreading’ formula[, which] calculated a claimant’s income
in a fiscal quarter and averaged the claimant’s weekly earnings, even if the
person did not actually make any money in a given week.”239 MiDAS
automatically determined a claimant engaged in fraud if the employee reported
no income for any week during a quarter in which the claimant earned income.240
At least 90% of the MiDAS fraud determinations were inaccurate.241 Part of
the problem was that MiDAS was mining corrupt or inaccurate data.242 For
instance, a consultant report found that MiDAS has trouble converting data from
the legacy system.243 MiDAS also could not read information scanned into the
system.244 Also problematic were the inaccuracies raised by the “income
spreading” formula.245 The Agency made no effort to check the system’s
findings.246
The implications were profound. Once MiDAS flagged fraud through a web
portal that many people did not check, the state garnished people’s wages,
federal and state income tax refunds, and bank accounts.247 The Agency used
these collection techniques without giving claimants an opportunity to contest
the fraud determinations.248 As alleged in an ongoing suit against agency
officials, the Agency “made no attempt to consider the facts or circumstances of
a particular case, or determine whether the alleged fraud was intentional,
negligent, or simply accidental.”249

237

Id.
Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 892 (6th Cir. 2019).
239
Id. at 892–93.
240
Id. at 893.
241
Paul Egan, Data Glitch Was an Apparent Factor in False Fraud Charges, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Jul. 30, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/07/30/fraud-chargesunemployment-jobless-claimants/516332001/.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 892–93.
246
Id.
247
Charette, supra note 224.
248
Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 894.
249
Id. at 894.
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Litigation surfaced damning evidence. In April 2015, plaintiffs brought a
class action against the Agency, alleging that the MiDAS “robo-adjudication[s]”
violated their due process rights.250 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Agency from
future constitutional violations and to require it to maintain proper procedures
for determining fraud.251 The complaint alleged that MiDAS never informed
claimants about the basis for the Agency’s finding of fraud.252 Under the terms
of the settlement, the Agency agreed to review all fraud determinations made by
MiDAS and to stop all collection activities including wage garnishments and tax
return seizures for claimants who received fraud determinations at the hands of
MiDAS.253 A class of plaintiffs has sued agency officials in their individual
capacity as well as the vendor who helped build the system.254 That case is
ongoing.
Five months later, the Agency ceased using MiDAS for fraud determinations
after being sued by the federal government.255 The state apologized for the false
claims for unemployment fraud.256 In August 2017, the Agency completed a
review of fraud cases and reversed 64% of them,257 promising to refund $21
million to claimants.258
MiDAS, like other malfunctioning government systems, created havoc.
People had to hire lawyers to fight the false fraud accusations.259 Many could
not afford counsel and had to fight the allegations alone, to little effect.260 They
suffered economic instability.261 Some people had to declare bankruptcy.262
Some had their homes foreclosed, and some “were made homeless.”263 People’s
credit scores suffered after their wages were garnished and tax refunds seized.264
250
Complaint & Jury Demand at 2, 26, Zynda v. Zimmer, No. 2:15-CV-11449, 2015 WL 1869615 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 21, 2015).
251
Id. at 27.
252
Id. at 11–12.
253
Stipulated Order of Dismissal at 6 n.1, Zynda v. Arwood, No. 2:15-CV-11449 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2,
2017).
254
Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 887.
255
Charette, supra note 224.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Lessenberry, supra note 233.
259
Id.
260
Memorandum of H. Luke Shaefer & Steve Grey, supra note 231 (discussing case of Barbara Hills, who
was erroneously accused of committing fraud on ten occasions, all for the same underlying mistake, and how
she had to protest each determination separately).
261
Id.
262
Charette, supra note 224.
263
Id.
264
Id.
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The financial harm exacted may exceed $100 million.265 Virginia Eubanks
rightly argues that government decision-making systems create a “digital
poorhouse.”266
At the federal level, there are glimpses of similar phenomena. Algorithmic
determinations have led to the erroneous seizure of people’s federal income tax
refunds and the garnishment of their wages. They have led to the wrongful
suspension of people’s Social Security benefits.267 But an especially dramatic
example deals with the ability of Americans to travel.
For many years now, the “No Fly” computer matching system has targeted
innocent people as terrorists without a meaningful chance to exonerate
themselves.268 The No-Fly List “prevents listed individuals from boarding
commercial aircraft.”269 Individuals were denied the right to fly; others were
detained at airports; still others were arrested.270 The “No Fly” data-matching
program misidentified individuals because it used crude algorithms that could
not distinguish between similar names.271 Thousands of people got caught in the
dragnet, including government officials, military veterans, and toddlers.272 The
U.S. government would not say if one was on the list and provided no
explanation for no-fly decisions.273
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit held that the composition of watchlists warranted
judicial review. The court noted:
Just how would an appellate court review the agency’s decision to put
a particular name on the list? There was no hearing before an
administrative law judge; there was no notice-and-comment
procedure. For all we know, there is no administrative record of any
sort for us to review. So if any court is going to review the
government’s decision to put [plaintiff] on the No-Fly List, it makes
sense that it be a court with the ability to take evidence.274
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Citron, supra note 13, at 1274.
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Ever since then, litigation has had a modest impact on the watchlist problem.
In those cases, discovery was often short-circuited by claims of executive
privilege or state secrets privilege.275 In a suit brought by the ACLU, thirteen
U.S. citizen plaintiffs (including several military veterans) alleged that the NoFly List prevented them from air travel.276 The FBI offered to take some of the
plaintiffs off the list if they became government informants.277 The federal court
found that the No-Fly list violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights, but refused
to dictate a suitable process.278
The court ordered the government to “fashion new procedures that provide
Plaintiffs with the requisite due process . . . without jeopardizing national
security.”279 The court ordered the government to disclose to the plaintiffs their
status on the watchlist.280
And yet, as Jeffrey Kahn explains, “watchlists are now an established feature
in the country’s national security architecture, as natural to a generation of
Americans born after 9/11 as submitting to a search at the airport.”281 Anyone
who remains on the No-Fly List will be unable to get meaningful notice and a
chance to be heard.282 The government still refuses to explain why someone
appears on the list, though people can file a “redress form” to get themselves
removed from the list. Barry Friedman astutely notes, “This sort of Kafkaesque
nightmare should scare all of us, right down to our anklebones.”283
People frequently experience “punishing personal trauma” in the wake of
erroneous automate decisions.284 In November 2004, Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim, an
accomplished architect and academic, was mistakenly included on the No-Fly
List.285 She was arrested, detained, and denied return to the U.S., despite twenty
years of legal residency.286 Ten years later, a federal district court judge

275
TODD GARVEY & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41741, THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE:
PREVENTING THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION DURING CIVIL LITIGATION 6
(2011).
276
Complaint at 4, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-750, 2015 WL 1883890 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2015).
277
See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint at 21–22, Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-CV-750 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2013).
278
Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1163 (D. Or. 2014).
279
Id. at 1162.
280
Latif, No. 3:10-CV-750, at *1.
281
Kahn, supra note 269, at 73.
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See FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 280.
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Id.
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Charette, supra note 224.
285
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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concluded that she should never have been included on the No-Fly List.287 The
judge captured her suffering in this way: “This was no minor human error but
an error with palpable impact, leading to the humiliation, cuffing, and
incarceration of an innocent and incapacitated air traveler.”288
B. Undermining Functionalism
This emerging record, taken together, paints a disturbing picture of unforced
errors and gaps in understanding and accountability. Recall again the rationale
of scholars and jurists in support of the administrative state. The legislature
commits its authority under broad delegations of power to agencies because
agencies have the requisite expertise and flexibility to govern a complex and
evolving world.
But agency officials do not appear to understand the systems they have
commissioned to carry out this task. Crucially, they cannot explain them in
public or in court because they do not know how they work. Whatever expertise
that officials hold gets translated—ostensibly—into software language that
officials have neither learned to speak nor have any bona fides to speak. Having
encoded agency rules in automated software systems, officials cannot exercise
discretion any more than members of the legislature. To the extent conditions
change—either fiscal, normative, scientific, or otherwise—the official is not in
a position to adapt.
In Arkansas, neither agency officials nor third-party providers are able to
articulate how to debug their system, despite the profound consequences for
disabled residents.289 Agency officials pointed the finger at third-party vendors,
who pointed it right back. In Texas, a court referred to an algorithmic system to
assess public teacher performance as a “house of cards” that was riddled with
uncorrectable errors.290 In Michigan, a fraud detection system was inaccurate
85% of the time, leading the agency to reverse 64% of determinations.291 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the government to fashion new
procedures around the No-Fly List, which have yet to be developed.292
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The administration law literature astutely addresses, in Jody Freedman and
Martha Minow’s words, “government by contract.”293 The U.S. government
relies extensively on third-party private contractors to carry out its
responsibilities, particularly in the military and intelligence sectors.294
Contractors are more difficult to supervise and hold accountable than
government employees.295 They have been known to waste government
resources or engage in outright fraud.296 Semi-private parties imbued with
sovereign authority can undermine democratic norms and diminish the capacity
of government itself to respond to citizen concerns.297
These concerns are neither overblown nor adequately addressed. Yet they
differ substantially from the trends in agency automation. The privatization
debate concerns which expert is entrusted to carry out the will of the public. In
some quarters, an excessive reliance on semi-private third parties threatens
constitutional safeguards and erodes sovereign legitimacy.298 Nonetheless,
contractors—whether technically public or private employees—are capable of
acting as repositories of expertise in the agency sense. Contractors are often
former government employees, which gives them bona fides in bids for
government work.299 Relying on subject matter expertise, they can still exercise
discretion, give reasons for decisions, and respond to evolving needs or
circumstances.
The administrative state’s turn toward automation is troubling because of the
absence of expertise and flexibility. The questions we raise are not about which
expert is appropriate but rather whether the absence of expertise undermines the
legitimacy of the automated administrative state. Software systems designed,
adopted, and deployed today lack the benefits of expertise almost entirely.
293
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow eds., 2009).
294
PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: HOW PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 129 (2007); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power:
Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT
BY CONTRACT, supra note 293, at 110, 110–11.
295
See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 293, at 291.
296
OFF. OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION & SUSTAINMENT, DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT TO
CONGRESS SECTION 889 OF THE FY 2018 NDAA REPORT ON DEFENSE CONTRACTING FRAUD 2–3 (2018).
297
Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV.
397, 468 (2006); Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional Accountability, and Outsourcing
Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1352 (2013).
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Ruben Berrios, Government Contracts and Contractor Behavior, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 119, 121 (2006)
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A number of caveats are in order. We know about the examples above
because they have resulted in litigation.300 Automated systems that litigants
challenge presumably represent the outer bounds of egregious agency action. At
the same time, it is possible that these egregious failures may only represent the
tip of the iceberg. That courts enjoined these systems does show that the
judiciary is capable of oversight to some degree.
The examples from ligation to date tend to involve state agencies, not federal
ones. Presumably the justifications for state agencies mirror those for federal
ones. There are also federal examples, such as the No-Fly List.301 Other
countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have similar struggles.302
Meanwhile, the APA imposes significant restrictions as to timing and venue for
challenging federal agency action, which state law may not, such that challenges
to federal systems may be more onerous.303 We do know, however, that federal
agencies are making increasing use of algorithms and automation as a matter of
fact and official policy.
Importantly, there are, in theory, existing pathways for agency officials to
reintroduce and reclaim their expertise, discretion, and flexibility. Agency
officials could become experts in the systems they administer, and those systems
could be built in such a way so as to preserve discretion and respond to changing
conditions in real time (e.g., through software updates). We are skeptical given
two decades of evidence, but it is analytically possible and worthy of further
exploration. Several recent works we mention take this approach. Kroll and his
coauthors develop a set of legal and technical principles—borrowed from the
realm of engineering—that they imagine as capable of restoring transparency
and accountability to administrative and other government decision-making.304
In a lengthy section titled “Informing Agency Deliberation with Technical
Expertise,” Mulligan and Bamberger offer an extensive vision for reintroducing

300
AI Now, the NYU-based think tank addressing the social impacts of artificial intelligence, has
assembled much of this litigation in a series of workshops in 2018 and 2019 entitled Litigating Algorithms. The
insights of this article are derived from their reports, but also from digging into the record and interviewing one
of the central litigants. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 25.
301
See supra notes 268–71 and accompanying text.
302
Luke Henriques-Gomes, The Automated System Leaving Welfare Recipients Cut Off with Nowhere to
Turn, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/oct/16/automatedmessages-welfare-australia-system (discussing the widespread problem with automated decision-making public
benefits systems in Australia).
303
The APA lays out the requirements for challenging agency action at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702–06, which courts
have filled out with thicker or additional requirements such as standing and ripeness.
304
Kroll et al., supra note 40, at 637.
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technical expertise into procurement and other important government
processes.305
Nevertheless, the more agencies automate under the current modus
operandi, the more they undermine the premise of the administrative state.
Agencies deserve the power they possess based on their expertise, flexibility,
and nimbleness. This is true not only at a pragmatic level, but also at the level
of first principles. Agencies that automate throw away expertise and discretion
with both hands. Automation also thwarts structural requirements, such as the
APA and meaningful judicial oversight.
Meanwhile, agencies waste money rather than make the gains in efficiency
or anti-biasing that justified the turn to automation in the first place. If this trend
holds or accelerates, it is high time for scholars and society to question not only
whether process guarantees are sufficient, but also whether the entire enterprise
is justified in the first instance. Congress seems as capable of contracting with
software vendors to automate enforcement. A Congress of machines has no need
for a middle person.
IV. TOWARD A NEW VISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Let us summarize the argument so far. In recent years, we have seen an
acceleration of a concerning trend toward inexpert, flawed automation.
Administrative agencies have increasingly turned to automation to make
consequential, binding decisions about the Americans they govern. The trend
has not gone unnoticed; as a rich, interdisciplinary literature shows, the
automation of the administrative state threatens important values, such as
participation and due process. This Article contributes to this discussion by
developing a challenge to the automated administrative state at the level of
justification: an overreliance on algorithms and software undermines the very
rationale for quasi-legislative bureaucracies. Recent litigation, in particular,
paints a vivid picture of agency officials who lack expertise in the systems that
they employ, cannot give reasons for binding agency actions, and throw away
the individualized discretion that justifies the administrative state in the first
instance.
The present state of affairs invites a variety of reactions. Above, we alluded
to an ongoing project that responds to automation’s disruption of rights and
values through a combination of legal and technical reforms. These include
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creating “transparent systems and assigning limited procedural and substantive
rights” (Schwartz),306 developing a full-throated conception of “open code
governance”307 and “technological due process” (Citron),308 reimaging fair
hearings309 and treating machines as state actors (Crawford and Schultz),310 and
developing technological tools for “procedural regularity” (Kroll et. al).311
As discussed, these responses largely involve restoring the status quo ex
ante, and shoring up eroded rights and values as opposed to re-examining and
justifying the administrative state in toto. Some academics and especially
activists in recent years have married this call to restore rights and values with
demands for a moratorium or ban on the use of automation by government
agencies unless or until its many deficiencies can be addressed.312
One response to claims of agency illegitimacy is to try to address the
shortfalls piecemeal through legal and technical design. A second response with
a long pedigree is to urge a dramatic reduction in the administrative state itself.
This is the approach of David Schoenbrod in Power Without Responsibility,
which conceptualizes the administrative state as a kind of political laundering
operation whereby Congress seeks to influence the world while shielding itself
from accountability.313 It is the approach of Philip Hamburger in Is
Administrative Law Unlawful?, which aims to counter the narrative that
“binding administrative power is . . . a novelty, which developed in response to
the necessities of modern life.”314 For Hamburger and others, the administrative
state represents a complex play for power. The proper response to political
laundering or the “revival of absolute power” is to adhere closely to the text of
the Constitution, dismantle the administrative state, and force Congress to do the
legislating.315 This is a fortiori true in an automated administrative state, wherein
agencies commit a significant portion of their power to still less accountable
third parties that design the systems agencies deploy.
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We are sympathetic to, and have deeply engaged with, the first project. To
the extent the adoption of technology by the state has eroded civil rights and
values, those rights and values should be restored or else the technology should
be abandoned. Yet as framed, neither the critique nor the recommendations cut
deep enough. Even were it possible somehow to design legal and technical
systems capable of fully restoring due process to automated decision-making, a
wholesale turn to automation by the agency officials could still undermine the
justification for the administrative state through the displacement of expertise
and discretion. But more importantly, the availability of new technological
affordances invites an additional, important question: is the status quo even
sufficient? Put simply, shouldn’t the availability of better tools lead to higher
standards for governance?
We are less sympathetic to the second project, at least at a practical level.
Conceptually, we understand that a large and expensive bureaucracy maintained
at public expense, lacking justification even under a functionalist interpretation
of the Constitution, should not be sustained. But the most plausible reason that
the administrative state has turned to automation in the first place is deliberate
resource constraints.316 Due in large measure to a political economy that has
systematically underfunded and disempowered the administrative state,
agencies struggle to meet the enormous needs and expectations of the populace.
“We blame the Department of Motor Vehicles for long lines at the counters,”
Jerry Mashaw writes, “not the legislature that refuses to fund additional
personnel and equipment.”317 We would not abandon the administrative state,
and the many people who rely upon it, on the basis that agencies have been
channeled by sustained political and economic forces into desperate measures
that undermine their legitimacy.
Ultimately, we prefer a third response, one that neither lets agencies off the
hook for their often devastatingly poor choices around technology, nor forces
agencies to abandon technology altogether on pain of political extinction. We
hope in this final section to lay out a positive vision for how the administrative
state might engage with new technology more wisely, beginning to re-justify
itself in light of new affordances and otherwise update its mission for the twentyfirst century. This positive program involves, at its base, the deliberate and self-

316
For a lengthy discussion of burdens on the administrative state, see generally Jack M. Beermann, The
Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599 (2018).
317
Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 27 (2001).
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conscious adoption of technology to the extent it furthers the rationales for
delegating authority and power to agencies and not otherwise.
The pathologies of the automated administrative state—discussed in detail
above318—have a common feature. When agencies displace human wisdom and
expertise in favor of systems that automatically confer or deny benefits and
rights, disaster has lurked around the corner. Innocent, everyday people are
barred from travel. Disabled individuals receive no or fewer health services,
falling well short of their needs. Teachers and other public employees lose their
jobs or cannot advance in their careers. In the analogous criminal context,
defendants—particularly racial minorities—spend longer in prison or jail due to
a perceived (and unjustified) risk. Meanwhile, administrative officials charged
by society to oversee these systems do not understand how they work, let alone
feel empowered to second-guess or override them. And addressing the high
prevalence of mistakes has so many costs that promised gains in efficiency are
never realized.
This mismanagement and suffering are all the more perverse as they take
place amidst the perception that we live in an age of technical wonders. Even as
we write, techniques of artificial intelligence are transforming the way people
live, work, and play. Two or more people who speak any of a hundred different
languages can communicate with one another in real time through language
translation systems.319 Algorithms parse billions of financial transactions and
emails to detect fraud and spam.320 Machine learning helps doctors diagnose
patients and weather forecasters develop faster, more accurate, and more
detailed models.321 Enormous, cross-disciplinary research initiatives—such as
the eScience Institute anchored at the University of Washington—fuel datadriven discovery across an array of fields.322
The modern American administrative state is well over a hundred years
old.323 Although we decry the actual deployment of automated software systems
by agencies to date, we would not deny our government the technological
affordances of the twenty-first century. As a diverse set of scholars have begun
318
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to observe, agencies can and sometimes do bring advances in information
technology constructively to bear on the incredibly complex task of regulation
and governance. Writing for the journal Nature with Kate Crawford in 2016, one
of us (Calo) highlighted the potential to deploy machine learning by law
enforcement to help identify officers at risk of excessive force.324 Just such a
system was deployed by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police the same year in
collaboration with a large, interdisciplinary team from seven major research
universities, leading to greater predictive accuracy, more targeted interventions,
and lower instances of misconduct.325
We are not alone in this position. British philosopher Helen Margetts and
economist Cosmina Dorobantu point to the capacity of technology to help
governments personalize information and services for constituents, offering
examples in Queensland, Australia, and New Zealand.326 California Supreme
Court Justice and Stanford Law professor Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar imagines
a role for machine translation services in discharging the obligation of federal
and state courts to provide interpreters where, as often, a lack of available
interpreters for defendants or witnesses can mean long delays of justice.327 In
their aforementioned defense of “regulating by robot,” Coglianese and Lehr cite
to the use of machine learning to predict chemical toxicities and sort the mail.328
These are just a few examples.329
We do not mean to endorse all or any of these specific-use cases. Each could
raise concerns; artificial intelligence systems have their inevitable flaws, and all
324

Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, 538 NATURE 311, 313 (2016).
Samuel Carton et al., Identifying Police Officers at Risk of Adverse Events, KDD (Aug. 17, 2016),
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think it could work.” Hal Hodson, US Police Use Machine Learning to Curb Their Own Violence,
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326
Helen Margetts & Cosmina Dorobantu, Rethink Government with AI, 568 NATURE 163, 164 (2019).
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technology is developed and deployed against a backdrop of long-standing
social, economic, and political inequities.330 In 2017, the social media giant
Facebook’s bespoke system mistranslated the phrase “good morning” in Arabic,
posted by a Palestinian worker leaning against a bulldozer in a West Bank
settlement, to “hurt them” in English and “attack them” in Hebrew.331 The post
led the man to be arrested and questioned by Israeli police—no doubt a deeply
fraught experience in light of the context.332 Similar concerns could arise in
virtually any application of artificial intelligence by government or industry.
We nevertheless note a difference in the character and orientation of these
interventions from the automated systems discussed in Part II. Specifically,
these potential interventions are oriented toward the furthering of substantive
commitments and values, such as access, quality, and self-assessment. They are
not designed simply to save costs (and in the process undermine procedural
commitments without garnering more efficiency), but rather to enhance the
capabilities of the administrative state itself—both agencies and officials—to
engage in more effective and fair governance. In general, they would not
outsource agency functions requiring expertise and discretion to third parties
whose software and hardware deliver neither. These efforts have potential to
enhance the justification of the bureaucratic state by, ideally, generating
knowledge, enhancing expertise, tailoring outcomes, and increasing
responsiveness—the purported reasons Congress created agencies to carry out
its will in the first place.
One of the areas ripe for change is in understanding the effects of policy
interventions in complex environments; new technological affordances may
open the door to less muddling and more modeling. In a classic 1959 article, The
Science of ‘Muddling Through’,333 political economist Charles Lindblom
develops the argument that administrators cannot and do not arrive at the “best”
policy prescription in any given context for several reasons. Notably, human
beings are incapable of ascertaining and processing all of the information they

330
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would need to calibrate an optimal policy intervention, even assuming unlimited
time.334
What Lindblom calls the “root” method of policymaking, whereby
policymakers ascertain and maximize values in a single exercise, is impossible
for real people.335 In his words:
Although such an approach can be described, it cannot be practiced
except for relatively simple problems and even then only in a
somewhat modified form. It assumes intellectual capabilities and
sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even
more absurd an approach to policy when the time and money that can
be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the case.336

Although the overwhelming majority of public administration literature
contemplates the root method, no public administrator deploys it in practice.337
Rather, public administrators follow a “branch” method instead.338 According to
the branch method, the administrator sets a specific goal and then attempts to
ascertain how to advance it step by step with each step assessed in isolation.339
Having deployed a particular intervention, the administrator then monitors its
effects, adjusting with new interventions each time the target or another value is
compromised in the real world.
Lindblom recognized the inevitability of the branch method and formalized
its application.340 Rather than exclude important factors haphazardly through
ignorance, as the root method inevitably does, the branch method focuses on a
single value at a time and then iterates.341 Throughout his important piece,
Lindblom relies again and again on the affordances of his contemporaries. The
root method is a futile attempt at “superhuman comprehensiveness.”342 It calls
for an analysis “beyond human capacity.”343 Administrators, being people, must
muddle through.
The intervening decades have not resulted, as even some of Lindblom’s
contemporaries predicted, in the creation of an artificial superintelligence. Yet
334
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 80–81.
Id. at 85.
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it cannot be gainsaid that the machines—and therefore, the humans—of today
are dramatically better at modeling multifaceted behaviors and effects than in
the late 1950s. This capacity to parse extreme complexity through a combination
of advances in statistical methods and greater computational processing power
has been further enhanced in recent years by techniques of artificial
intelligence.344 The upshot is that contemporary institutions, including state and
federal agencies, have access to far greater means by which to simulate a given
regulatory context. Some units of government, such as the CDC, NOAA, and
the U.S. military, have long capitalized on this new affordance.345 Many other
units have largely ignored it.346
We do not predict that technology will somehow overcome all of the
limitations of the root method that Lindblom identifies. For example, machines
may be no better than officials at ascertaining unregistered citizens’ preferences.
And machines rely upon people to choose their inputs and goals.347 Computer
models can enshrine deeply problematic assumptions into policy while
harboring pretensions of impartiality. Science, technology, and society scholar
Kevin Baker offers the example of SimCity, a software-based game that came
to inform urban planning.348 SimCity looked open-ended but in fact embedded
the assumptions of the libertarian Jay Forrester in Urban Dynamics that growth
should come at all costs and nearly all government interventions in the market
backfire.349
Over time, however, administrators may increasingly learn to model through
instead of muddling forward. Meanwhile, unlike the reflexive automation of
benefits through software, the generation of complex models of specific
industries and spheres of life continues to require expertise in those contexts.
Agency officials that model through are still making the ultimate decision about
whether and when to intervene in humans’ lives and environments.
344
Interestingly, many of these techniques were already outlined in theory at the time of Lindblom’s paper.
It took decades, however, for neural networks and other approaches to artificial intelligence to become applicable
in practice. Other techniques such as reinforcement learning were developed subsequent to 1959. Bobby
Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1759–60, 1763 (2019); see also Imposter Syndrome, OCTAVIAN REP. (2019), https://
octavianreport.com/article/hany-farid-fight-threat-deepfakes/ (interview with Hany Farid discussing “datadriven machine learning technologies called deep neural networks”).
345
See supra notes 17, 229 and accompanying text.
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edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RoboticsCommissionR2_Calo.pdf.
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Alternatively, we might conceive of an interdisciplinary body to act as a
repository for knowledge about modeling itself that can lend technical assistance
across government.350
In endorsing agency deployment of new technological affordances to meet
a more stringent standard of public administration and service, we acknowledge
various limitations. Most notably, it seems non-trivial to draw defensible lines
between offensive and inefficient automation on the one hand, and other,
beneficial uses of new affordances that further legitimacy on the other. Although
an inaccurate model of the world is not self-executing in the same way as a
benefits algorithm, agencies could succumb to well-evidenced automation bias
and over-rely on faulty computer conclusions in predicting the effects of
intervention.351
We are keenly aware of the limitations of the affordances we explore,
limitations that have often inured to the detriment of the most vulnerable. As
agencies turn algorithmic tools inward to gain awareness of concerning practices
by police or other officials, there is a danger they will disproportionately identify
people of color as candidates for intervention just as the use of “heat maps” leads
disproportionately to police encounters with innocent people of color.352 As
Charles Reich warned more than fifty years ago, systematization of data
collection and surveillance in the administrative state inevitably exacted
profound costs to the poor and marginalized.353
We are also aware that even mere automation can have benefits. In theory,
by automating menial tasks, agencies could free up resources and personnel to
deal with the needs of the public on a more individualized basis. There is a
reason that administrative, civil, criminal, and even constitutional procedure
places an emphasis on efficiency. Governments could create a perfect system
for the lucky few that never made any errors.354 But then justice would be
delayed for, and hence denied, to many others.355 In a world of constrained
resources, greater efficiency translates into greater access.
350

See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 25, at 830–33.
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Our point is more basic. The American administrative state has, to date,
systemically eroded its legitimacy by adopting technological systems that
undermine the very qualities that justify agencies to begin with. The proper
lodestar for adopting new technical tools is not merely that they come with a
failsafe against trammeling civil liberties. Agencies should look for technical
ways to enhance the expertise, discretion, and capacity for individualization that
justifies committing such significant public power to bureaucratic entities in the
first place. Even apart from justification, the literature should consider whether
the new software and algorithms available to agencies should ratchet up societal
expectations. Today’s agencies today should be doing more with more, not less.
CONCLUSION
At various points in American history, scholars, lawmakers, and courts have
debated the legitimacy of the administrative state. Arguably at odds with the
tripartite structure of the Constitution, the agencies regulating our daily lives
have nevertheless been on firm footing for a long time—in reverence to their
critical role in governing a complex, evolving society. More specifically,
agencies are said to be repositories of expertise in the contexts and people they
regulate. They promise more rapid and individualized responses to evolving
conditions. And, in any event, they are limited and channeled by safeguards,
from their organic statute, to the APA, to the courts.
Many state and federal agencies have in recent decades embraced a novel
mode of operation: automation. Were the present trend to hold, we should expect
more and more reliance on software and algorithms by agencies in carrying out
their delegated responsibilities. Already, this automated administrative state has
been shown to be riddled with concerns. In particular, legal challenges in state
and federal court regarding the denial of benefits and rights—from travel to
disability—have revealed a pernicious pattern of cruel, sometimes bizarre
outcomes.
The legal academy has been attentive to these developments, but in a
particular way. A literature dating back many years explores the pitfalls of
automation from the perspective of due process and other denials of rights and
values. There have been wise suggestions to intervene through changes to law

(Apr. 16, 1963), http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html (“We must come to see . . . that
‘justice too long delayed is justice denied.’” (quoting “one of our distinguished jurists” (likely William
Gladstone))).
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and the design of systems in order to restore the status quo, displaced and
disrupted by the introduction of software and algorithms.
Largely missing from this conversation, however, are broader, structural
critiques of the legitimacy of agencies. As unfolding litigation across the country
shows, automated systems in the administrative state highlight the extent to
which agency officials have re-delegated their responsibilities to third-party
systems that are little understood even by their creators. As agencies throw away
the very qualities that justify their authority, it is fair to begin to question whether
and why they retain legitimacy to carry out the will of the legislature.
Our answer is not to dismantle the administrative state. Instead, we urge
critical thinking about why agencies find themselves in this position—for
example, the chronic lack of resources best laid at the feet of the legislature or
executive. Nor should agencies abandon tools of the twenty-first century.
Rather, the proper response to a pending legitimacy crisis within the
administrative state is to furnish a better lodestar for when to develop and deploy
technology. Agencies should procure new tools if and only if they enhance,
rather than undermine, agency claims of being better situated than the legislature
to govern daily life.

